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ARTICLES
Stanley Mosk: A Federalist for the 1980's
By ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG*
Introduction
The era of the Burger Court has been marked by significant erosions
of the safeguards set forth in the Bill of Rights.1 A number of the
Court's decisions have overturned or circumscribed important Warren
Court opinions, particularly in the area of civil rights and civil liberties.2
This trend has been criticized sharply by several members of the Court
who-contrary to long-standing practice-have "gone public" to air
their views.3
* Former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Distinguished
Professor of Law Emeritus, Hastings College of the Law.
The author is grateful for the assistance of Meredith J. Watts, a member of the California
Bar and a former editor of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, in the preparation of
this article.
1. See generally Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith, " and Beyond, 69 IOWA
L. REv. 551 (1984); Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L.
REV. 1085 (1982); Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of Property Rights as the Foremost Princi-
ple of Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 66
(1980); Frank, The Burger Court-The First Ten Years, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101
(1980); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv.
489, 495-98 (1977); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. Rnv. 873 (1976); Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York.- Some Anxious
Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198
(1971).
2. A few examples from just the 1984-85 Term are Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501
(1984); Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984); and New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct.
2626 (1984). See also infra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
The Burger Court seems to be following the election returns, which evidence a strong
conservative trend throughout the country. See Will, Realignment Is a Fact, Wash. Post, Nov.
8, 1984, at A27, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1984, at A19, col. 5. But the Court's proper role
in our system of checks and balances is to resist the ebb and flow of public caprice. See gener-
ally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH-THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLrTCS (1962); P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1962).
3. See, eg., Justices Making Their Frustrations Public, Wash. Post, Sept. 23, 1984, at A8,
col. 1 (citing separate speeches by Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens decrying the Bur-
ger Court's shift away from individual constitutional protections).
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The ultimate goal of the rule of law is to assure equal justice for all.4
A major achievement of the Warren Court was to "no longer permit"
constitutional guarantees "to remain an empty promise."5 The Warren
Court instead gave meaning to those guarantees.6 The Burger Court,
however, is reverting more and more to sterile legalism, dry and lifeless
dogma, and unfounded assumptions that serve to insulate the Constitu-
tion from the real world it was intended to affect.
In the face of the Burger Court's distorted landscape of federal con-
stitutional law,7 a number of enlightened state court judges are turning to
their state constitutions to find protection for individual rights. Justice
Stanley Mosk is, I think, the acknowledged leader in the development of
state constitutional adjudication. In his opinions, articles, and addresses,
he has charted the course for state courts to follow in safeguarding fun-
damental human rights.'
It is a privilege to join in this well-deserved tribute to Justice Mosk.
Although I hold him in the highest personal regard, I shall resist the
temptation to write about him in personal terms. Instead, I will discuss
his important achievements in the area of state constitutionalism.
I. The Federalist Mandate-An Historical Perspective
In the Federalist Papers, James Madison set forth the proper distri-
bution of powers between the state and national governments in a federal
system. He observed that the powers of the federal government "are few
and defined," while "[t]hose which. . . remain in the state governments
are numerous and indefinite."9 In one of the earlier papers, Alexander
Hamilton remarked that the "one transcendent advantage belonging to
the province of the State governments [is] the ordinary administration of
criminal and civil justice."1 These principles were later embodied in our
constitutional scheme of government.
4. The motto etched over the great doors of the Supreme Court building in Washington,
D.C. is "Equal Justice Under Law."
5. See A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUsTIcEs: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT
3-31 (1971).
6. Id.
7. See Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific
Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 171-72 (1984).
8. Two outstanding examples are People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099,
119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) and People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890 (1978). See also Remarks of Justice Stanley Mosk to the National Conference on State
Constitutional Law, Williamsburg, Virginia (March 9, 1984) (unpublished).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 319 (J. Madison) (Tudor Pub. Co. ed. 1937).
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 113 (A. Hamilton) (Tudor Pub. Co. ed. 1937).
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Despite the tenets of federalism, however, our country's develop-
ment as a nation has necessitated more and more federal intrusion into
state governance. Each of the great landmarks in our national history
has led to the assumption of a greater responsibility by the federal gov-
ernment, including the federal judiciary."1 From the Civil War through
the era of westward migration, industrial growth, and economic expan-
sion abroad, and into this century with its two World Wars, the Great
Depression, and the New Deal, there has been a steady centralization of
authority in the federal government.12
In the calm and relative prosperity following World War II, many
of the problems engendered by nation-building, sectional strife, and the
economy seemed to dissolve into less pressing issues. Our nation's courts
began to address long neglected problems: the extension of civil liberties
to blacks and the protection of the individual rights of all.13
At this stage in our history the state courts were in a poor position
to bring about change. The great flow of authority from the states to the
federal courts over the previous 150 years had rendered the state high
courts "mere bus stops on the route from trial courts to the United States
Supreme Court."1 4
A. Constitutional Law and the Warren Court
Recognizing its unique responsibility, the Warren Court took up the
judicial challenge of the latter half of the 20th century. The Warren
Court brought about equality in our democratic representative system
through the reapportionment cases.15 The Court revolutionized the ad-
ministration of criminal justice by scrupulously enforcing the basic guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights.16 It also translated "our society's proclaimed
belief in racial equality into some measure of legal reality.
17
As every law student knows, these advances were made at the cost
of some overrulings. But although they have been the subject of much
11. See A. GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 3-6.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 4-5.
14. Remarks of Justice Stanley Mosk, supra note 8. See also Wright, In Praise of State
Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 167-74 (1984).
15. See Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16. See, eg., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
17. A. GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 5. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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controversy,18 the Warren Court's overrulings were carefully and selec-
tively made. The Warren Court adhered strictly to a principle that I
term "constitutional stare decisis." 9
In my view, because the Constitution contains a built-in prejudice in
favor of the individual, it requires that the courts afford much greater
respect to individual liberties than to the abstract principle of stare deci-
sis.2° Thus, where a court seeks to overrule in order to cut back on fun-
damental constitutional protections, the commands of stare decisis must
be all but absolute.21 Where, however, a court overrules to expand per-
sonal liberties, the doctrine should be much less restrictive.22 The War-
ren Court's overrulings reflected this distinction.23
B. Constitutional Law and the Burger Court
The Burger Court has demonstrated over the past fifteen years that
it disagrees with this view of constitutional stare decisis.24 The California
Supreme Court felt the effects of the Court's changed attitude almost
immediately after the appointment of Chief Justice Burger.25
18. See, e.g., Noland, Stare Decisis and the Overruling of Constitutional Decisions in the
Warren Years, 4 VAL. U.L. REV. 101 (1969); Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial
Review, 17 CATH. U.L. REv. 20 (1967).
19. See generally A. GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 65.
20. Id. at 76-85. The doctrine of stare decisis has been applied with uneven force in con-
stitutional decisionmaking over the whole course of our history, and especially by the Warren
Court.
21. Id. at 85-97.
22. The arguments that support this view of stare decisis are set forth in my book, EQUAL
JUSTICE. Essentially, they are as follows: First, some overruling is necessary to facilitate the
expansion of individual liberties that the Constitution was designed to permit. Id. at 85. As the
Framers anticipated, such expansion is necessary to meet new and unforeseen evils. Id. at 85-
86. Second, adherence to stare decisis when a contraction of rights is sought guards against
"the tyranny of the majority." Id. at 86-87. Third, "if the Court overrules to contract liber-
ties, it may convict a man ex post facto .. " Id. at 88. Thus, the Court's adherence to stare
decisis when contraction is sought may protect substantial reliance interests. Id. at 89.
Fourth, the contraction of individual liberties may have the undesirable symbolic effect of
inducing "the belief that the Court is sanctioning repression." Id. at 93. Finally, "fo]nce [an]
advance in constitutional rights has been made ... the reasons that counseled inertia evapo-
rate[,] leaving no reason to later move backward." Id. at 96.
23. Id. at 90-97.
24. Illustrative are the Court's "Miranda" and "exclusionary rule" opinions. See infra
notes 31-43, 45, 68-70, 132-167 and accompanying text; see also Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S.
380, 383-384 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens points out that "the Court's recent
history indicates that ... it has been primarily concerned with vindicating the will of the
majority and less interested in its role as a protector of the individual's constitutional rights."
Id. at 383. Justice Stevens went on to cite nineteen cases in which the Burger Court had
reversed decisions upholding constitutional rights. Id. at 383-84 n.3.
25. Compare the California Supreme Court's discussion of U.S. Supreme Court decisions
involving the Fifth Amendment in the Warren era in Prudhomme v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. 3d
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To cite an early example, one of Justice Mosk's 1969 opinions, Peo-
ple v. Green,26 struck down a California statute allowing prior testimony
to be admitted at a later trial.27 The United States Supreme Court had
held previously that the use of such testimony violated the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.28 Although the Green opinion fol-
lowed seemingly settled federal law, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.2 9 The early Burger Court subsequently reversed, holding that prior
testimony was admissible so long as the declarant was present at the later
trial and available for full cross-examination.3 °
More recently, the Burger Court decided several Fourth and Fifth
Amendment cases in the 1983-84 Term that emphasize its ever-increas-
ing divergence from the Warren Court's jurisprudence.3" In Nix v. Wil-
liams,3 2 for example, the Court adopted its "inevitable or ultimate
discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule.33 This exception permits
the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of a criminal defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights when the prosecution can show, by a
preponderance of evidence, that the information ultimately would have
been discovered through lawful means.34
In Nix, the defendant had revealed the location of a corpse during
an unlawful interrogation-conducted outside the presence of counsel-
320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970) with its discussion of Burger Court decisions in In
re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 673, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985).
26. 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969), vacated, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
27. 70 Cal. 2d at 665, 451 P.2d at 429, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 789. Justice Mosk's opinion relied
upon both Supreme Court precedent (see Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969); Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)) and a one year old California
case in which federal certiorari had been denied (People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d
111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969)).
28. Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
29. 396 U.S. 1001 (1969).
30. 399 U.S. 149, 160-61 (1970). I chose this example not because it is an especially signifi-
cant case in and of itself, but rather because it illustrates an early signal of the Burger Court's
departure from the Warren Court era. The signal was not a false one. The trend continues
today. See supra note 1 and infra note 31; see also infra text accompanying notes 32-43; Illi-
nois v. Gates, 426 U.S. 213 (1983) (lowering the standard of probable cause for obtaining a
search warrant); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that containers found in
an automobile during a warrantless search may be searched without a warrant); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that the entire passenger compartment of an automobile
may be searched without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest).
31. Some important decisions not discussed here include United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct.
3405 (1984) (adopting the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule) and Hudson v.
Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment's protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures does not apply within the confines of a penal institution).
32. 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
33. Id. at 2509-10.
34. Id.
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after the interrogating officer had promised not to discuss the crime with
the defendant in his lawyer's absence. The substance of the testimony
offered in support of the inevitable discovery claim was that at one point
during the investigation searchers had been proceeding toward the gen-
eral area in which the body was found."5
The crime involved in Nix was the tragic murder of a small child.
Yet, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his separate opinion, the heinous
circumstances of a crime do not "permit any court to condone a violation
of constitutional rights."' 36 Moreover, the future application of the
Court's "inevitable or ultimate discovery" exception does not depend
upon the presence of facts similar to those in Nix. Indeed, one need not
strain the imagination to see how-with good intentions-law enforce-
ment officials might routinely avail themselves of such a potentially for-
giving exception and engage in unconstitutional interrogation.
In Segura v. United States,37 the Burger Court limited the exclusion-
ary rule further.3" The Court's opinion condoned the search of an indi-
vidual's apartment and all of its contents by federal narcotics agents,
even though the initial warrantless entry was admittedly unconstitu-
tional.3 9 As Justice Stevens pointed out in his forceful dissent," the ma-
jority completely ignored the intended purpose of the exclusionary rule
in order to restrict the "protection of criminal activity" that-in the ma-
jority's view-the rule affords.41
It is, in my view, a bleak day for the Constitution when the Supreme
Court decides that since a defendant is an unsavory character, the abro-
gation of his constitutional rights by law enforcement authorities may be
excused.42 The constitutional rights of those whom society blesses with
35. Id. at 2512.
36. Id. at 2513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37. 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984).
38. Segura provides an excellent example of the Court's practice of paying lip service to
an established principle (here the exclusionary rule) by first listing its historical bases. See id.
104 S. Ct. at 3385-86. Having done so, the Court typically goes on to remove another "cog
from the wheel" that powers the rule, leaving the reader uncertain of its current extent and
force.
39. Although the Court stated that the legality of the original entry and search was not
before it, the traditional construction of the exclusionary rule would treat the original illegality
as infecting all of the evidence subsequently obtained, making it inadmissible. See, eg., Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766-67 n.12 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484
(1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Here, I think, the Court artifically
divided the case into two supposedly unrelated parts in order to allow it to consider only the
post-search warrant conduct.
40. 104 S. Ct. at 3392 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court was divided five to four, with
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its approval are at risk when the rights of those less highly regarded are
not protected.43
C. State Constitutionalism
In the era of the Burger Court, the responsibility of protecting indi-
vidual liberties has fallen on state courts. Some enlightened state ju-
rists-such as Justice Mosk-have met the challenge." Others,
regretfully, have been slower to respond.
Justices Brennan and Marshall have begun recently to encourage
state courts to implement the guarantees found in state constitutions. In
his Michigan v. Mosley dissent, Justice Brennan wrote:
In light of today's erosion of Miranda standards as a matter of
federal constitutional law, it is appropriate to observe that no state
is precluded by [this] decision from adhering to higher standards
under state law. . . . [S]tate courts and legislatures are, as a mat-
ter of state law, increasingly according protections once provided
as federal rights but now increasingly depreciated by decisions of
this Court.4
To its credit, the California Supreme Court has long recognized the
validity of Justice Brennan's observations.46 As a result of Justice
Mosk's leadership, California has developed a substantial body of state
constitutional law based on the principles enumerated in the state's Dec-
43. I discussed this point in EQUAL JUSTICE in connection with Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964). I quoted Winston Churchill, and believe it is appropriate to do so again here:
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals
is one of the most unfailing tests of any country. A calm, dispassionate recognition
of the rights of the accused, and even of the convicted criminal, against the State-a
constant heart-searching by all charged with the duty of punishment-a desire and
eagerness to rehabilitate in the world of industry those who have paid their due in the
hard coinage of punishment: tireless efforts towards the discovery of curative and
regenerative processes: unfailing faith that there is a treasure, if you can only find it,
in the heart of every man. These are the symbols, which, in the treatment of crime
and criminal, mark and measure the stored up strength of a nation, and are sign and
proof of the living virtue within it.
A. Goldberg, supra note 5, at 12-13 (quoting W. Churchill, Speech to House of Commons
(July 20, 1910)).
44. The Supreme Court of Hawaii has also been in the forefront of the movement toward
state constitutionalism. See, eg., State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974); State v.
Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
45. 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. The California Supreme Court's earlier decisions relying on state constitutional provi-
sions to uphold individual liberties were frequently authored by Chief Justice Wright. See,
e,g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 958 (holding the death penalty unconstitutional under the California Constitution's
Declaration of Rights). After Justice Wright's retirement in 1977, Justice Mosk-the most
senior member of the court-became the primary spokesman for state constitutionalism.
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laration of Rights.47 The Supreme Court of California now leads the
country in the progressive development of state constitutional law.
In several of his opinions, Justice Mosk has provided a comprehen-
sive explication of the bases for state constitutionalism. The primary ba-
sis is the premise that a state high court may interpret its own
constitutional provisions as imposing higher standards than are imposed
by analogous provisions of the federal Constitution. As Justice Mosk
noted in People v. Brisendine,48 the United States Supreme Court has
"clearly recognized that state courts are the ultimate arbiters of state law,
even [with respect to] textually parallel provisions of state constitutions,
unless [their] interpretations purport to restrict the liberties guaranteed
the entire citizenry under the federal charter."49 Justice Mosk found oc-
casion to reiterate this principle in People v. Disbrow:50 "We . . . reaf-
firm the independent nature of the California Constitution and our
responsibility to separately define and protect the rights of California citi-
zens despite conflicting decisions of the United States Supreme Court in-
terpreting the federal Constitution. Indeed the United States Supreme
Court has recently characterized this proposition as 'good law' ..
Justice Mosk's Brisendine opinion disposed of the argument that the
states' various bills of rights are simply copies of the federal Bill of
Rights:
[T]he California Constitution is, and always has been, a document
of independent force. Any other result would contradict not only
the most fundamental principles of federalism but also the historic
bases of state charters. It is a fiction too long accepted that provi-
sions in state constitutions textually identical to the Bill of Rights
were intended to mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson of
history is otherwise: the Bill of Rights was based upon the corre-
sponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than the
reverse. 'By the end of the Revolutionary period, the concept of a
Bill of Rights had been fully developed in the American system.
Eleven of the 13 states. . . had enacted Constitutions to fill in the
political gap caused by the overthrow of British authority ...
• . . Eight of the Revolutionary Constitutions were prefaced
by Bills of Rights, while four contained guarantees of many of the
most important individual rights in the body of their texts. In-
47. CAL. CONSTr. art. I.
48. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
49. Id. at 548, 531 P.2d at 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (citing Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1965)).
See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967).
50. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
51. Id. at 114-15, 545 P.2d at 280-81, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69.
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cluded in these Revolutionary constitutional provisions were all of
the rights that were to be protected in the federal Bill of Rights. By
the time of the Treaty of Paris (1783). . .the American inventory
of individual rights had been virtually completed.' . . . In partic-
ular, the Rights of the Colonists (Boston, 1772) declared for the
first time 'the right against unreasonable searches and seizures that
was to ripen into the Fourth Amendment'. . . . [T]hat protection
was embodied in every one of the eight state constitutions adopted
prior to 1789 which contained a separate bill of ights ....
In his Diamond v. Bland dissent,53 Justice Mosk contrasted the legal
milieux in which the California and federal constitutions were drafted. 54
While the federal drafters had to bear in mind the " 'broad, guiding prin-
ciples'" of a federation of states, the California drafters were more con-
cerned with "'the exigent details of a [new] sovereign state
government.' 5 Justice Mosk noted that the California "document was
drafted by a constitutional convention that was a reflection of the youth,
heterogeneity and independence of the state at that time."56 He con-
cluded that "the guarantees of individual liberties contained in the Cali-
fornia Constitution were not founded upon, are not dependent upon, and
have a status independent of, the Constitution of the United States."'5 7
In this same dissent, Justice Mosk observed that it is inappropriate
to attempt to reduce "diverse federal and state premises to a single body
of 'constitutional law.' "58 One reason, already discussed, is that the pro-
visions and historical bases of the federal and state constitutions are not
the same. The other is that such reductionism contradicts the hierarchi-
cal logic of constitutional doctrine.59 The proper hierarchy requires that
claims raised under a state constitution be disposed of before any Four-
teenth Amendment claim is reached.'
In People v. Longwill,6" Justice Mosk addressed the argunent that a
52. 13 Cal. 3d at 549-50, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (quoting 1 SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY 383, 199, 206 (1971)) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
53. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 335, 521 P.2d 460, 463, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (1974) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
54. Id. at 337-38, 521 P.2d at 465, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 473 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 338, 521 P.2d at 465, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 473 (quoting Palmer & Selvin, The
Development of Law in California, in I CAL. CODES ANNOT., CONSTITUTIONS 14 (West
1954)).
56. 11 Cal. 3d at 338, 521 P.2d at 465, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 473 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 336, 521 P.2d at 464, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 336-37, 521 P.2d at 464, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (citing Linde, Without "Due
Process" Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 133-35 (1970)).
61. 14 Cal. 3d 943, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975).
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state court may rely upon independent state grounds only in certain nar-
rowly defined circumstances. 62 He wrote:
This argument presupposes that on issues of individual rights
we sit as no more than an intermediate appellate tribunal, and that
to the presumption of further review there is but a 'limited' excep-
tion which must be 'clearly delineated.' On the contrary, in the
area of fundamental civil liberties-which includes not only free-
dom from unlawful search and seizure but all protections of the
California Declaration of Rights-we sit as a court of last resort,
subject only to the qualification that our interpretations may not
restrict the guarantees accorded the national citizenry under the
federal charter. In such constitutional adjudication, our first refer-
ent is California law and the full panoply of rights Californians
have come to expect as their due. Accordingly, decisions of the
United States Supreme Court defining fundamental civil rights are
persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but
are to be followed by California courts only when they provide no
less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.
63
II. Justice Mosk's Application of State Constitutionalism
in California Law
In his opinions, Justice Mosk has found an independent state consti-
tutional basis for most, if not all, of what we have come to think of as our
"fundamental rights." Although the California Constitution's Declara-
tion of Rights is more specifically inclusive than the federal Bill of
Rights," it is convenient to use the common shorthand references to the
various federal guarantees. I shall therefore use these designations to fa-
cilitate discussion of Justice Mosk's application of the guarantees found
in the California Constitution.
Justice Mosk has authored a number of opinions in the area of
"Fourth Amendment rights," establishing high standards of conduct for
California law enforcement authorities. 65 In People v. Brisendine,6 6 for
62. The circumstances were not specified in the opinion.
63. 14 Cal. 3d at 951 n.4, 538 P.2d at 758 n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 302 n.4.
64. For example, the California Constitution's Declaration of Rights contains sections
dealing with employment discrimination, art. I, § 8, and safeguards in criminal prosecutions,
art. I, § 15.
65. See, e.g., infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
Although the holdings of these opinions may have been abrogated by the passage of the
initiative measure known as "Proposition 8" (now art. I, § 28 subd. (d) of the California Con-
stitution) and the recent opinion of the California Supreme Court upholding its so-called
"truth in evidence" provision, see In re Lance, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr.
631 (1985); but cf. People v. Castro, 30 Cal. 3d 301, 211 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985),
these developments do not detract from the valuable example that Justice Mosk's opinions
provide. See, e.g., Ramona R. v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 3d 802, 693 P.2d 789, 210 Cal. Rptr.
example, he wrote that a warrantless weapons search, justified in its in-
ception, could not be extended to containers that could not possibly con-
ceal an ordinary weapon, "absent a showing of reasonable suspicion of
the presence of an atypical weapon." 67 To get around the Burger Court's
contrary decision in United States v. Robinson,68 Justice Mosk expressly
based the court's holding upon article I, section 13 of the California
Constitution. 9
Justice Mosk disagreed with the Court's implication in Robinson
that "'an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no
significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person.' "70
He likewise rejected the Court's proposition that "'[t]he authority to
search. . does not depend on what a court may later decide was the
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence
would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.' "71 Instead, Jus-
tice Mosk observed that the converse of the Robinson conclusion "would
seem to be true: having in the course of a lawful weapons search come
upon a crumpled cigarette package, the officer would have no reasonable
ground to inspect it."72
The Brisendine line of cases 73 illustrates an important advantage of
state constitutionalism: despite the confusion generated by federal con-
stitutional decisions in the last fifteen years,74 under the state constitution
204 (holding that Proposition 8 does not abrogate state constitutional protection against self-
incrimination, which requires that statements made by a juvenile to her probation officer at a
fitness hearing may not be used against her at a subsequent trial).
66. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
67. Id. at 547, 531 P.2d at 1111, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
68. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
69. That section provides, in part, that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be
violated .... "
70. 13 Cal. 3d at 547, 531 P.2d at 1111, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 327 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S.
at 237 (Powell, J., concurring)).
71. 13 Cal. 3d at 547, 531 P.2d at 1110-11, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27 (quoting Robinson,
414 U.S. at 235).
72. 13 Cal. 3d at 547 n.15, 531 P.2d at 1111 n.15, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 327 n.15.
73. Among the other cases in this line are People v. Laiwa, 34 Cal. 3d 711, 669 P.2d 1278,
195 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983); People v. Maher, 17 Cal. 3d 196, 550 P.2d 1044, 130 Cal. Rptr. 508
(1976); People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975); and
People v. Simon, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1974).
74. The Burger Court is continually casting doubt upon the approved interpretation of
proper police conduct. Justice Mosk acknowledged this recently, in Ramona R. v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. 3d at 808-09, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208:
In People v. Coleman, . . . 13 Cal. 3d 867, 878-86 [533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr.
384 (1975)], we examined federal law in the area of use immunities. We declined to
decide whether such immunities were compelled by the United States Constitution,
because '[t]he federal law on the subject is currently in a state of confusion.' (Id. at p.
878.) The developments since that time have not changed our opinion. (Compare,
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California law enforcement personnel have had consistent guidelines to
follow in carrying out investigations and arrests. This consistency tends
to prevent confusion and inadvertent errors on the part of peace officers
in the state.
In the area of "First Amendment rights"-freedom of speech, as-
sembly, and petition-Justice Mosk recently has persuaded the United
States Supreme Court to adopt his view that California law provides a
more appropriate measure of protection than that provided by the federal
Constitution with respect to expressive activity on private property.7"
The California Supreme Court elaborated this view in a series of cases
involving the right of individuals or groups to distribute handbills and
circulate petitions in privately owned shopping centers.76 The first of
these cases was Diamond v. Bland.77
The plaintiffs in Diamond had attempted to gather signatures on
anti-pollution initiative petitions in an enclosed, privately-owned shop-
ping mall after their request to the mall's managers for permission to
circulate the petitions had been denied. Security guards removed them
from the mall's premises. When their request for injunctive relief was
denied, they appealed to the California Supreme Court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Mosk held that, absent any inter-
ference with business operations, the "bare title" of a shopping center's
owners did not outweigh the interest of individuals and groups in con-
ducting orderly First Amendment activities on the premises." The Dia-
mond plaintiffs subsequently obtained a permanent injunction restraining
the shopping center owners from interfering with their activities.7 9
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court decided Lloyd
Corporation v. Tanner.8" The Court held that the owners of an Oregon
e.g., Melson v. Sard (D. C. Cir. 1968) 402 F.2d 653, 655 ['any self-incriminatory
statements made in a parole revocation hearing shall not be used affirmatively against
the parolee in any subsequent criminal proceeding'] with Ryan v. State of Montana
(9th Cir. 1978) 580 F.2d 988, 991 [no immunity against introduction as evidence at
trial for statements made by a probationer at a revocation hearing].) Thus, we must
base our determination on the state Constitution.
See also supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text and infra note 134.
75. Pruneyard Shopping Centers v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 n.8 (1980). See infra notes
85-91 and accompanying text.
76. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Centers, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), afd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Diamond v. Bland (Diamond II), 11 Cal. 3d 331,
521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal.
3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied sub nom. Homart Dev. Co. v.
Diamond, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
77. 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970).
78. Id. at 666, 477 P.2d at 741, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
79. See Diamond II, 11 Cal. 3d at 333, 521 P.2d at 461-62, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 469-70.
80. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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shopping mall could prohibit the distribution of political leaflets unre-
lated to the business of the shopping center.81 In light of Lloyd, the trial
court that had issued the injunction in favor of the Diamond plaintiffs
dissolved its decree.82
On the Diamond plaintiffs' second appeal, the California Supreme
Court affirmed, finding no ground for distinguishing Lloyd. 3 Justice
Mosk, however, dissented. In his lengthy and well-reasoned opinion,
Justice Mosk argued that the California Constitution provided greater
protection of the speech interests at stake, and that the court was not
precluded from relying upon independent state constitutional grounds in
following its earlier Diamond holding."
Although Justice Mosk's views did not prevail in Diamond II, they
did prevail five years later in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center."
Justice Newman's majority opinion in Robins concluded that Lloyd did
"not preclude law-making in California which requires that shopping
center owners permit expressive activity on their property."86 Justice
Newman went on to hold "that sections 2 and 3 of article I of the Cali-
fornia Constitution protect [rights of] speech and petitioning, reasonably
exercised, in [privately owned] shopping centers."87 Diamond II was ex-
pressly overruled.
88
The Pruneyard case went to the United States Supreme Court,
where a substantially unanimous majority approved of Justice Mosk's
Diamond II rationale.89 The Court held that the California Declaration
of Rights, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, could provide
"individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the federal
Constitution."90 In a welcome reaffirmation of the principle of federal-
ism, Justice Rehnquist wrote that "the State's asserted interest in pro-
moting more expansive rights of free speech and petition" in no way
violated the United States Constitution. 91
81. Id. at 568-70.
82. Diamond I, 11 Cal. 3d at 333, 521 P.2d at 462, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
83. Id. at 335, 521 P.2d at 463, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
84. Id. at 335, 521 P.2d at 463, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice
Mosk's Diamond opinion is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 77-79.
85. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), af'd, 447 U.S. 74 0980).
86. Id. at 905, 592 P.2d at 344, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
87. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
88. Id.
89. Pruneyard Shopping Centers v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). As is increasingly com-
mon, various Justices joined in only parts of the opinion, and several wrote concurrences. Id.
at 75-76.
90. Id. at 81.
91. Id. at 85.
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These brief highlights illustrate the extent of Justice Mosk's applica-
tion of California constitutional law to protect individual rights. While a
review of all of Justice Mosk's independent state grounds opinions is be-
yond the scope of this article, two important subjects warrant more ex-
tended consideration. They are the juror exclusion case of People v.
Wheeler,92 and the California case law progeny of Miranda v. Arizona.93
A. The Right to a Fair Trial: People v. Wheeler
One of Justice Mosk's most outstanding civil liberties opinions is
People v. Wheeler.94 In Wheeler, Justice Mosk led his court and the
country in refusing to follow the thirteen year-old case of Swain v. Ala-
bama,95 which established a virtually insurmountable presumption of ra-
cial neutrality in the use of peremptory juror challenges.96
The Swain case involved a nineteen year-old black defendant's ap-
peal from a rape conviction. The defendant had been convicted by an all-
white jury and sentenced to death. As the primary basis for his appeal,
he made a prima facie showing of systematic and total exclusion of black
veniremen from Talladega County juries through the state's use of its
power to strike jurors. 97
Despite the defendant's showing, and over my dissent,98 the major-
ity refused to apply the well-settled rule that any state action resulting in
the exclusion of blacks from participation in the justice system violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 Instead,
the Court applied its presumption of neutrality, which, it suggested,
could be rebutted only by a showing that "the prosecutor. . ., in case
after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever
the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of
Negroes . . .with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries
92. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
93. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
94. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890.
95. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
96. Id. at 219.
97. The Alabama "power to strike jurors" is that state's equivalent of the California "per-
emptory challenge," which is defined as "an objection to a juror for which no reason need be
given, but upon which the Court must exclude him." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1970).
Jurors may also be challenged for cause on the grounds of either actual or implied bias. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1073 (West 1970).
98. Swain, 380 U.S. at 228 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 228-31. Beginning with Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) and
extending through Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964), the Court had applied the
rule consistently.
... "I" In effect, the majority chose to elevate the prosecution's statu-
tory right to exercise peremptory challenges above the defendant's con-
stitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. I disagreed with the
majority's analysis, and proposed a pragmatic solution that would ac-
commodate the use of peremptory challenges without abrogating funda-
mental rights. 10 1
The ensuing thirteen years produced few cases in which a defendant
was able to meet the stringent burden of proof set forth by the Swain
plurality. °2 During this interim, the Court held that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to trial by jury in significant criminal cases was applicable to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.0 3 The Court also held that
the exclusion of all women from jury service violated the Sixth Amend-
ment right of a defendant to a jury selected from a representative cross-
section of the community."° Despite these advances, the Court stead-
fastly refused to reconsider Swain.'0 5
In People v. Wheeler,'06 Justice Mosk took the initiative. The de-
fendants in Wheeler were two black men who had been convicted by an
all white jury of murdering a white grocery store owner in the course of a
robbery. While a number of blacks had been in the jury venire, the pros-
ecutor had used his peremptory challenges to strike all of them. The trial
court, following Swain, ignored the defendants' protestations of unconsti-
tutional discrimination. The resulting convictions were appealed.
The California Supreme Court reversed. 0 7 In his ground-breaking
100. 380 U.S. at 223. As I pointed out in my dissent, the majority assumed the petitioner
had not made a prima facie showing of racially discriminatory state action. Id. at 233. In fact,
the record contained ample evidence of discrimination. Id. at 233-38.
101. I suggested that where, as in Swain, a prima facie showing of unlawful juror exclusion
was made, "[t]he burden of proof [would shift] to the State to prove, if it could, that [the]
exclusion was brought about for some reason other than racial discrimination ... " Id. at
238.
102. In United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983), the court's search re-
vealed only two post-Swain cases in which a particular prosecutor was found to have used
peremptory challenges unconstitutionally under the Swain requirements. Id. at 1316. The
court noted that "[a]Ithough case law repeatedly describes the defendant's burden of proof as
"not insurmountable," e.g., United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929, 930 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217-18 (5th Cir.
1971), defendants in state and federal courts have been overwhelmingly unable to establish a
prima facie case of systematic exclusion." Id. See also People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 286 &
n.35, 583 P.2d at 768 & n.35, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909 & n.35.
103. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
104. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
105. The Court consistently refused to grant certiorari in cases involving alleged facially
discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge. See, e.g., Miller v. Illinois, Perry v. Louisiana,
and McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
106. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
107. Id. at 287, 583 P.2d at 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
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majority opinion, Justice Mosk set forth precisely what is unconstitu-
tional about the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. He
explained:
[W]hen a party presumes that certain jurors are biased merely be-
cause they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on
racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. . . and peremptorily
strikes all such persons for that reason alone, he not only upsets
the demographic balance of the venire but frustrates the primary
purpose of the representative cross-section requirement. That pur-
pose. . is to achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the inter-
action of the diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their
group experiences. . . .[I]f jurors are struck simply because they
may hold those very beliefs, such interaction becomes impossible
and the jury will be dominated by the conscious or unconscious
prejudices of the majority.}'°
Analyzing the Swain opinion, Justice Mosk noted:
[It] obviously furnishes no protection whatever to the first defend-
ant who suffers. . discrimination in any given court--or indeed
to all his successors, until 'enough' such instances have accumu-
lated to show a pattern of prosecutorial abuse ...
Moreover, even if we consider only the defendant who be-
lieves himself in a position to invoke the exception suggested in
Swain, we see that his attempt to comply with the federal standard
of proof is bound to fail. The defendant is party to only one crimi-
nal proceeding, and has no personal experience of racial discrimi-
nation in the other trials held in that court. Nor can he easily
obtain such information, for several reasons. First, those defend-
ants who are indigent or of limited means cannot afford to pay
investigators to develop the necessary data. Second, even if the
funds were available. . . the time is not. . . .Third, even if the
funds and time were available, the data is not. . ... '
Justice Mosk added that "[i]t demeans the Constitution to declare a fun-
damental personal right under that charter and at the same time make it
virtually impossible for an aggrieved citizen to exercise that right." '
Relying upon the independent right to trial by jury embodied in the
California Constitution's Declaration of Rights, "' Justice Mosk set
108. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
109. Id. at 285-86, 583 P.2d at 767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09.
110. Id. at 287, 583 P.2d at 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10.
111. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16. Grounded on provisions of the California Constitution,
Justice Mosk's decision was insulated from review. It is perhaps not as easy, however, to
insulate a case today. As Justice Mosk has pointed out:
It appears that the present Supreme Court. . .will reach for cases-particularly
when a defendant's rights have received an expansive interpretation-if the state
court cites both federal and state authorities. The Montana Supreme Court learned
the hard way in Montana v. Jackson, 460 U.S. 1030 (1983); citation in the opinion to
forth a new procedure for the California courts to follow in the Swain
situation. Simply put, if the defendant believes his opponent is using his
peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the ground of "group bias"
alone, he must raise the point in a timely fashion.112 If the defendant
makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to show
that the challenges were exercised for reasons other than group bias.
1 1 3
Justice Mosk set forth some of the factors a court may consider in
determining whether a prima facie showing of group bias has been
made, I 4 and, if so, whether the prosecution has met its burden of justifi-
cation. 1 If a court finds that the prosecution's:
[B]urden of justification is not sustained as to any of the questioned
peremptory challenges, the presumption of their validity is rebut-
ted. Accordingly, the court must then conclude that the jury as
constituted fails to comply with the representative cross-section re-
quirement, and it must dismiss the jurors thus far selected. So too
it must quash any remaining venire, since the complaining party is
entitled to a random draw from an entire 
venire ....
Several other state courts have now rejected Swain and adopted the
Wheeler approach. In fact, virtually every recent opinion on the subject
of juror exclusion refers to Wheeler. In Commonwealth v. Soares, 1 7 the
Massachusetts high court quoted extensively from Wheeler and adopted
the Wheeler remedy verbatim.118 An Illinois appellate court recently fol-
lowed Wheeler, stating: "We abhor and condemn the practice of the use
of the peremptory challenge to strike all blacks from a jury. The injury is
not limited to the defendant; there is injury to the jury system, to the
community at large, and to the democratic process reflected in our
courts."
1 19
The Florida Supreme Court and a New York appellate court each
the state constitution seven times did not insulate the judgment from vacation by the
High Court.
Remarks of Justice Stanley Mosk, supra note 8.
In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court announced that state
court opinions must overcome a "presumption" against independent state grounds. See also
Welsh, Whose Federalism?-The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties Judgments,
10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819, 833-56 (1983).
112. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
113. Id. at 280-83, 583 P.2d at 764-66, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-07.
114. See id. at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
115. See id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
116. Id.
117. 377 Mass. 476, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
118. 377 Mass. 476-91, 387 N.E.2d at 510-18.
119. People v. Smith, 91 Ill. App. 3d 523, 530-32, 414 N.E.2d 1117, 1122-24 (1980).
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have adopted slightly modified versions of Wheeler.120  Still other courts
have expressed a willingness to adopt Wheeler in an appropriate case.
12 1
Finally, in State v. Crespin,122 a New Mexico appellate court adopted an
unusual approach incorporating both Swain and Wheeler. The court
held "that improper, systematic exclusion by use of peremptory chal-
lenges can be shown (1) under Swain .. .or (2) under the Wheeler-
Soares rationale. . . where the absolute number of challenges in the one
case raises the inference of systematic acts by the prosecutor."'
123
In United States v. Childress,124 the Eighth Circuit joined the long
list of critics of Swain and pointedly invited the Supreme Court to review
it.' 25 Justices Marshall and Brennan have sought consistently to effect
such review in dissents to denial of certiorari. 2  Although Swain is
clearly out of step with other decisions of the Court that protect individ-
ual rights,' 21 the Court's majority has continued to resist these and other
urgings. In my view, Justice Mosk's careful explication of the fundamen-
tal constitutional rights involved in these cases, coupled with his detailed
description of a fair and workable remedy which does no significant vio-
lence to the peremptory challenge, makes further delay insupportable.
Whether the Court finally will reconsider its Swain criteria may be
determined in the 1985-86 Term. A petition for certiorari was filed in
March 1985 in Abrams v. McCray, 21 which presents a direct challenge to
Swain. The Court carried over the petition for decision in the upcoming
Term,129 perhaps because of its ambivalence. Yet, regardless of the out-
120. See State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486-87 (Fla. 1984); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d
87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981).
121. See, eg., State v. Gilmore, 195 N.J. Super. 163, 478 A.2d 783 (1984); Saunders v.
State, 401 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 (1980). A number of jurists
have advocated the adoption of Wheeler in dissenting and concurring opinions. See, eg.,
Shockley v. State, 282 Ark. 281, 283, 668 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1984) (Hollingsworth, J., dissenting);
State v. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361, 1364-73 (La. 1979) (Dennis, J., concurring); State v. Blanson,
364 So. 2d 1308 (La. 1978) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
122. 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980).
123. Id. at 487, 612 P.2d at 718.
124. 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
125. Id. at 1316-17, 1320. For an extensive list of commentators who have criticised the
burden of proof required by Swain, see id. at 1316.
126. Davis v. Illinois, 464 U.S. 867, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1017 (1984); See, eg., Gilliard
v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867 (1983) (citing Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 890); McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963-66 (1983). Although Justices Stevens,
Blackmun and Powell voted to deny certiorari in McCray, they recommended that state courts
should serve "as laboratories in which the [Swain] issue receives further study before it is
addressed by this Court." Id. at 963.
127. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 228-31 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
128. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. March 4,
1985) (No. 84-1426).
129. 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985).
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come of Abrams, state courts may rely upon their own state constitutions
to cure the defects of Swain, and the Wheeler opinion has shown them
the way.
130
B. Miranda and Its California Progeny
Another example of Justice Mosk's use of state constitutional provi-
sions to protect civil liberties can be found in the line of cases interpreting
the California Constitution's parallel to the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.1 3 1  What have long been termed "Miranda
rights" 132 are being eroded steadily by the Burger Court,133 largely
through a process of piecemeal redefinition.
134
Recent California cases, in contrast, have remained true to Miranda
130. The effect of Wheeler has been felt beyond the context of exclusion through peremp-
tory challenges of minorities from juries. In State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), the Utah
Supreme Court held that it is not improper to inquire during voir dire whether a juror holds
his opposition to alcohol consumption on religious conviction. The court stated its agreement
with Wheeler and quoted the opinion extensively. It reasoned that not to allow voir dire to
focus on possible sources of actual or implied bias would vitiate the efficacy of the peremptory
challenge system and lead to 'group bias' of the kind held unconstitutional in Wheeler. Id. at
1059.
131. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
132. As enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), a defendant
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
133. See, eg., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (resumption of interrogation of a
defendant who has invoked his Miranda right to remain silent is not a per se violation of the
defendant's Miranda rights) (see infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text); United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 234 (1975) (privilege against self incrimination does not bar the court
from ordering the defense to turn over a report prepared by the defense investigation regarding
his discussions with a defense witness) (see infra text accompanying notes 162-67); Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statement made by a defendant to police may be used to
impeach his credibility, even if the statement is inadmissible under Miranda as part of the
prosecution's direct case) (see infra text accompanying notes 139-48).
134. This redefinition is especially clear in a case from the 1983 Term, New York v.
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). The U.S. Supreme Court created a "public safety" exception
to the once clear directives of Miranda and reversed a ruling suppressing a statement obtained
by police in violation of Miranda requirements. The dangerous ambiguity inherent in the
Court's "public safety" exception prompted Justice O'Connor to write in her separate opinion:
Today, the Court concludes that overriding considerations of public safety justify the
admission of evidence-oral statements and a gun-secured without the benefit of
[Miranda] warnings. In so holding, the Court acknowledges that it is departing from
prior precedent. . . and that it is 'lessen[ing] the desirable clarity of [the Miranda]
rule['].. .. Were the court writing from a clean slate, I could agree with its hold-
ing. But Miranda is now the law and, in my view, the Court has not provided suffi-
cient justification for departing from it or for blurring its now clear strictures.
104 S. Ct. at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens in the dissenting opinion, was
more direct:
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and its predecessor, Escobedo v. Illinois.135 The underlying principles in
those decisions were that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive,
and that procedural safeguards, including the presence of counsel, are
essential if the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is to be
anything more than a paper right.13 6 California's "Miranda" case law
has shown remarkable consistency and can be summed up in a single
sentence: Custodial interrogation must wholly cease when the suspect
indicates in any manner that he wishes to exercise his right against self-
incrimination, and must not be resumed until counsel has arrived.
131
In a number of cases, the California Supreme Court has been faced
with the option of following the Burger Court's departures from Mi-
randa'38 or adhering to Miranda and its California progeny. Under Jus-
tice Mosk's leadership, the California court has relied consistently on its
own constitution to resist the federal erosions. In People v. Disbrow,3 9
for example, the court refused to follow Harris v. New York."4 In Har-
ris, the United States Supreme Court held that a statement obtained in
violation of the requirements of Miranda could be admitted for impeach-
ment purposes if found to be trustworthy. 4 ' As Justice Mosk noted in
his Disbrow opinion, however, adherence to the Harris rule "would res-
[T]he majority abandons the clear guidelines enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona ... ,
and condemns the American judiciary to a new era of post hoc inquiry into the pro-
priety of custodial interrogations. More significantly, and in direct conflict with this
Court's long-standing interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, the majority has en-
dorsed the introduction of coerced self-incriminating statements in criminal
prosecutions.
104 S. Ct. at 2641-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
135. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
136. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
137. The court has adhered to this principle despite persistent challenges in a number of
factual contexts. For example, confessions were deemed inadmissible when a defendant's ini-
tial invocation of Miranda rights was overcome by police assertions that confessions had been
obtained from accomplices. People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817
(1968). In another case, a confession was found inadmissible when a detainee's request to talk
to his parents was ignored and interrogation resumed. People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450
P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969); see also People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971). A confession also was held inadmissible where interrogation was resumed
after a suspect had telephoned an attorney but before the attorney arrived. People v. Randall,
1 Cal. 3d 948, 464 P.2d 114, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1970). Finally, a confession was held inadmissi-
ble when police continued efforts to extract a waiver of a suspect's right to counsel after the
suspect requested an attorney be present during the suspect's interrogation. People v. Enri-
quez, 19 Cal. 3d 221, 561 P.2d 261, 137 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1977).
138. Concern about the Court's commitment to Miranda has heightened during this Term.
See, e.g., Justice Marshall's dissent in New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2641-50.
139. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368 (1976).
140. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
141. Id. at 224.
urrect the remains of the earlier voluntariness test," '42 thereby forcing
the trial courts into the very "evidentiary thicket Miranda was designed
to avoid."143 He observed also that a rule permitting the use of illegally
obtained confessions for impeachment purposes would leave "little or no
incentive for police to comply with Miranda's requirements."
144
Justice Mosk's principal objection to the Harris rule, however, was
that it created a "considerable potential that a jury, even with the benefit
of a limiting instruction, [would] view prior inculpatory statements as
substantive evidence of guilt rather than as merely reflecting on the de-
clarant's veracity." 145 Faced with the prospect of his illegally obtained
confession being revealed to the jury, a defendant would "be under con-
siderable pressure to forego [exercising his] basic right [to testify in his
own behalf].' 46
Justice Mosk avoided the Harris result by relying on the California
Constitution. 47 He concluded that "the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion of article I, section 15, of the California Constitution precludes use
by the prosecution of any extrajudicial statement by the defendant,...
either as affirmative evidence or for purposes of impeachment, obtained
during custodial interrogation in violation of the standards declared in
Miranda and its California progeny."'
4
Justice Mosk again refused to depart from Miranda in People v. Pet-
tingill. 49 The State argued in Pettingill that statements obtained after a
defendant had invoked his right to remain silent were admissible under
the Burger Court's holding in Michigan v. Mosley. 5°
The Court had held in Mosley that "the admissibility of statements
obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends
under Miranda on whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupu-
lously honored.' """1 Applying a newly crafted test, the Court found ad-
missible a confession which followed a renewal of interrogation by a
different police officer, on a separate floor of the police station, and with
regard to a different crime. The Court relied heavily on the circum-
142. 16 Cal. 3d at 111, 545 P.2d at 278, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
143. Id. at 112, 545 P.2d at 278, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
144. Id. at 113, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
145. Id. at 112, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368. He acknowledged that his court
was not the first to reject Harris on state constitutional grounds. Id. at 113-14, 545 P.2d at
280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (citing State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971)).
148. 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
149. 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978).
150. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
151. Id. at 104.
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stances of the interrogation"5 2 to avoid the plain mandate of Miranda
that an invocation of the right to remain silent, once made, must thereaf-
ter be respected.
15 3
The facts in Pettingill were similar to those in Mosley. After twice
invoking his right to remain silent, the defendant was given a fresh set of
Miranda warnings by a different officer, and was questioned about a se-
ries of crimes unrelated to the first. The defendant's subsequent confes-
sion was admitted into evidence at his trial. Writing for the majority,
Justice Mosk rejected the contention that his court was bound to follow
the Mosley decision. 54 He reiterated that the California Constitution is
" 'a document of independent force,'" and added that the court could
not "abandon settled applications of its terms every time changes [were]
announced in the interpretation of the federal charter."1 55
Justice Mosk went on to examine the logical and practical problems
inherent in the Mosley test. He first noted its inconsistency with the prin-
ciples underlying Miranda:
[O]n the facts of [Mosley] the high court held that a suspect's right
to cut off questioning will be deemed 'scrupulously honored' when
the second interrogation (1) occurs 'only after the passage of a sig-
nificant period of time' and (2) is conducted by a different police
officer and deals with a different crime. But these are precisely the
techniques-lengthy incommunicado detention and the switching
of interrogators and charges-which. . . endanger [the] privilege
[against self-incrimination] by increasing the pressures on the sus-
pect to confess in order to end his forced isolation ... .
Justice Mosk also pointed out Mosley's potential for creating confu-
sion and doubt:
[The] Mosley test is evidently designed to apply to ...circum-
stances [other] than those presented in the case itself. But the
opinion does not attempt a compendium of such additional cir-
cumstances, and indeed the effort would have been futile. A major
element of uncertainty is thus injected into the law: when has a
suspect's right to cut off questioning been 'scrupulously honored?'
152. Id. at 99-107.
153. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 473-74. The holding in Mosley was based on the
doubtful premise that the halting of the first interrogation meant the suspect's Miranda rights
had been respected, and that a fresh rendition of the Miranda rights, together with a "change
in the circumstances of the interrogation," rendered the subsequent confession voluntary. 423
U.S. at 99-107.
154. 21 Cal. 3d at 247-48, 578 P.2d at 118-19, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
155. Id. at 247-48, 578 P.2d at 118, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
156. Id. at 249, 578 P.2d at 119, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
Not only is this obviously a question of degree, but the very
elements of the equation remain unidentified....
. . .Given the high stakes involved in the admission of a con-
fession into evidence, both trial and appellate counsel operating
under the Mosley test would doubtless feel compelled to litigate
every conceivable factual aspect ...
. . .[D]elays in adjudication would be inevitable [, and] in a
certain number of cases [the Mosley test] would undoubtedly pro-
duce inconsistent results on essentially similar facts. The stability
and predictability of the law on this important topic would thereby
be impaired, making it more difficult for the police to conform
their conduct to constitutional dictates.157
The California Supreme Court recently demonstrated again its ad-
herence to Miranda protections, despite their erosions during the Burger
years. In In re Misener, 15 a public defender challenged his contempt of
court citation for failure to obey court ordered discovery. Following di-
rect examination of several defense witnesses, the prosecution sought dis-
covery of prior statements made by them to defense counsel. The court
held that the California Penal Code statute, which compelled the discov-
ery compliance, was unconstitutional "because it violates that aspect of
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination requiring the prosecu-
tion to carry the entire burden of proving the defendant's guilt.
1 59
In his opinion, Justice Mosk observed that the drift away from Fifth
Amendment protection for the accused began as early as 1970, in a series
of decisions allowing broad prosecutorial discovery.160 That same year
the California Supreme Court had reaffirmed the privilege against self-
incrimination:
[The] American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not
inquisitorial, and.., the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essen-
tial mainstay. . . .Governments, state and federal, are thus con-
stitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently
and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against
the accused out of his own mouth. . . .The People must 'shoulder
the entire load' of their burden of proof in their case in chief, with-
157. Id. at 249-51, 578 P.2d at 119-20, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
158. 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985).
159. 38 Cal. 3d at 545, 698 P.2d at 638, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 570 (holding unconstitutional
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1102.5).
160. Id. at 549, 698 P.2d at 640-41, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 572-73. See Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970) (Court upheld a Florida notice-of-alibi statute requiring a criminal defendant to
give notice to the prosecution of an intended alibi claim, including details of the alibi and
names and addresses of intended alibi witnesses). See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470
(1973) (similar Oregon statute did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, although it did violate the defendant's due process rights because of the statute's
failure to provide reciprocal discovery for the defense).
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out assistance either from the defendant's silences or from his com-
pelled testimony. 6 '
The Burger Court's interpretation of the protection afforded by the
Fifth Amendment departs from this fundamental principle. In United
States v. Nobles,162 the court stated that the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination does not extend to the testimony or statements of third
parties called as defense witnesses at trial. 16  The defense counsel pro-
posed to call its investigator to challenge the validity of identification of
the defendant by the prosecution's eyewitnesses. The Court held that it
was not unconstitutional to compel discovery of the investigator's written
report detailing the interviews he had conducted with the witness.
'61
As Mosk emphasized in Misener, "the rationale in Nobles fail[s] to
consider the aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination that re-
quires the prosecution to carry the entire burden of convicting a defend-
ant. The privilege forbids compelled disclosures from the defendant that
will aid the prosecution."1 6 The Framers of our Bill of Rights sought to
limit "the awesome investigative and prosecutorial powers of govern-
ment" through constitutional safeguards. 66 Where those federally guar-
anteed safeguards are also provided in state constitutions, the
construction of those protections is left to the state courts, "'informed
but untrammelled by the United States Supreme Court's reading of par-
allel federal provisions. .. . 67
161. Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 325, 466 P.2d 673, 676, 85 Cal. Rptr.
129, 132 (1970) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (citations omitted)). The
court also observed that from the vantage point of 1970,
the United States Supreme Court. . .has placed increasing emphasis upon the role
played by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in protecting the
rights of the accused. The privilege is now an element of due process protected
against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, and federal standards govern in
state proceedings (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [(1964)] . . .); the prosecution and
trial court are now forbidden to comment or instruct upon the accused's silence, or
his reliance upon the privilege (Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [(1965)]. . .); and
the application of the privilege to the accusatory stage has been considerably broad-
ened (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [(1966)] . ).
Id. at 323-24, 466 P.2d at 675, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131. The court noted that "[t]he privilege
against self-incrimination appears in various forms in state and federal constitutional and stat-
utory provisions. (See U.S. CONST. 5th Amend.; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13; [CAL.] PEN. CODE
§§ 688, 1323; [CAL.] Evid. Code §§ 930, 940.)" Id. at 323 n.4, 466 P.2d at 675 n.4, 85 Cal.
Rptr. at 131 n.4.
162. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
163. Id. at 234.
164. Id. at 233-35.
165. 38 Cal. 3d at 558, 698 P.2d at 648, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
166. Id. at 551-52, 698 P.2d at 642-43, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 574-75.
167. Id. at 549, 698 P.2d at 641,213 Cal. Rptr. at 573 (quoting Reynolds v. Superior Court,
12 Cal. 3d 834, 842-43, 528 P.2d 45, 49-50, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 441-42 (1974)).
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Conclusion
I salute Justice Stanley Mosk because he is an outstanding jurist and
a leader in expounding the concept of state constitutional law. It will be
said of Justice Mosk, in the perspective of time and history, that he never
sought to enlarge the judicial power beyond its proper bounds nor feared
to carry it to the fullest extent that duty requires.

